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A SWEET DEAL FOR SUGAR
Jeff LeBlanc*
"Some people win the lottery; other people grow sugar."
- James Bovard'
I. INTRODUCTION
Agricultural subsidies are a hot topic. The evolution of the world
economy through globalization and loosening of trade restrictions has
inspired caution and trepidation, while simultaneously creating
tremendous economic benefits. The future of agriculture in the developed
world is one of the most important issues facing the global economy
today. Through closed markets, tariff schemes, and domestic subsidies,
many developed countries support domestic agricultural production and
limit the importation of cheaper, more efficiently made products from
developing countries. Sugar is one such product. This paper will analyze
the United States domestic sugar market as an exemplar of domestic
subsidy and tariff programs in general. The purpose of this analysis is to
advocate market efficiency and reduce waste through application of the
perfectly competitive economic model. The paper will provide a brief
introduction to the history of sugar. An overview of the sugar program in
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 will be provided as
well. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 is the current
law in regards to agricultural subsidies, although a new farm act is
currently being proposed and should be enacted by the end of 2007. For
the most part, the proposed 2007 act's proposed sugar system is nearly
* Mr. LeBlanc graduated Summa Cum Laude from the University of LaVerne College of
Law with his J.D. in May, 2007. While interested in sugar since his first halloween, it
was his travels through Queensland, Australia that piqued his interest in trade and the
trade in sugar. He wishes to thank John, Kevin, Ashley, and Don for believing in him!
1 James Bovard is a libertarian author and speaker who targets government largesse and
waste. Mr. Bovard is a frequent contributor to a number of magazines, scholarly articles,
and newspapers. Mr. Bovard has also authored a number of libertarian leaning books
such as LOST RIGHTS (1994), FREEDOM IN CHAINS (1999), and TERRORISM AND
TYRANNY (2003).
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identical to the 2002 system. The six fundamental assumptions of the
perfectly competitive market will be discussed and applied to the domestic
sugar industry. Finally, there will be a discussion of the domestic and
international impact of the United States sugar program. The argument
that an elimination of the tariff system and abolition of the government
non-recourse loan program is in the best interests of the United States, and
international sugar farmers will be presented.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUGAR
The Western World's first exposure to sugar occurred during the
campai Fs of Alexander the Great, near the end of the fourth century
B.C.E.. Nearchos, one of Alexander's commanders referred to a crop
grown by the Indians as a "reed that gives honey without bees."' This
crop was sugar cane, which is thought to have originated on New Guinea.4
Sugar was first brought to the Americas by Columbus.5 In August of
1492, Columbus stopped for supplies at the Canary Islands, and was gifted
sugar cane cuttings by the island's governess, Beatrice de Bobadilla.6
Initially, sugar production in the Americas was concentrated in the
Caribbean and South America.7  However, sugar growing has long since
spread to the United States. The United States government has long relied
on the imposition of government tariffs on sugar as a means of generating
revenue.8  The modern sugar program is based upon the Federal
2 Plant Cultures: Exploring Plants and& People, Sugar Cane-History, available at
http://www.plantcultures.org.uk/plants/sugar_canehistory.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2007).
3 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, The Sugar Story, Big Sugar: Sweet, White and
Deadly, http://www.cbc.caldocumentaries/bigsugar/sugar.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2007).
4 Found at http://www.plantcultures.org.uk/plants/sugar-cane-history.html (last accessed
Apr. 18, 2007).
s Sugar Cane-History, supra note 2.
6 id.
7id.
8 Jose Alvarez and Leo C. Polopolus, The History of U.S. Sugar Protection, (1990)
(revised 2002), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edulSC19#FOOTNOTE_2 (last visited
Apr. 18, 2007).
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Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR).9 FAIR expired
in 2002 and was supplanted by the Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002.1o The 2002 farm statute is in effect until enactment of the
2007 farm act and has maintained, or supplemented, most of FAIR's sugar
related provisions." Both the 1996 and 2002 farm statutes provide
pricing support for sugar cane and sugar beet farmers through low interest
government loans and restrictive import tariffs and quotas.' 2
In the United States, sugar cane is grown principally in Florida and
Louisiana, with some production in Texas and Hawaii.13  Sugar cane
production was 26,604,000 short tons14 in 2005 and is estimated to be
29,799,000 short tons in 2006. ' Sugar beets are grown in California,
Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.' 6 Total United States
production of sugar beets was 27,537,000 short tons in 2005 and
33,765,000 short tons in 2006.'1
III. PRICE CONTROLS AND NON-RECOURSE LOANS
United States agricultural policy protects sugar prices in two ways:
through a non-recourse loan program under the Farm Securities and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 and the Tariff Rate Quota system through the
Office of the United States Trade Representative.
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-127, 110
Stat. 888, 889 (1996).
10 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-171, 116 Stat. 134
(2002).
"1 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-171, 116 Stat. 134
(2002). See also U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, 2002 Farm Bill, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/Farmbill/titles/titlelcommodities.htm (comparison of
the 1996 and 2002 Farm Bills) (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
12 See U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, 2002 Farm Bill, supra note 11.
13 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., CROP PRODUCTION, App. A-2
(2007), available at http://usda.mannlib.comell.edulusda/current/CropProd/CropProd-10-
12-2007.pdf .
14 One metric ton is equivalent to 1.10231125 short tons.
15 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERv., supra note 13.
1 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERv., supra note 13, at App. A-
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The United States sugar program provides non-recourse loans to
domestic sugar producers in exchange for their crops whenever the
domestic sugar price falls below the government loan rate.' 8  Non-
recourse loans are commodity secured loans with a set duration. At the
end of the set time, usually 9 months, farmers can either repay the loan
plus interest, or forfeit their crop.19 An American farmer can grow sugar
cane or sugar beet with the knowledge that, should the domestic price of
sugar drop below the loan rate per pound of crop (and considering
incidental expenses), the farmer can transfer his crop to the government
Commodity Credit Corporation for money.20 The raw cane sugar loan
rate is 18 cents per pound, and the current refined beet sugar loan rate is
22.9 cents per pound of sugar.21 The loan rates are the same under the
Farm Securities and Rural Investment Act of 2002 as the loan rates under
1996's FAIR.22
The Farm Securities and Rural Investment Act of 2002 and the
Office of the United States Trade Representative utilize import restrictions
called Tariff Rate Quotas to restrict the importation of foreign sugar into
the United States based upon quantities negotiated during the Uruguay
Round of negotiations.23 Quotas are established for each country and state
how much sugar can be imported into the United States from each
particular country.24
The Farm Securities and Rural Investment Act of 2002 requires,
"to the maximum extent practicable, the Secretary shall operate the
program established under this section at no cost to the Federal
Government by avoiding the forfeiture of sugar to the Commodity Credit
18 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-171, 116 Stat. 134
(2002).
9 U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, The 2002 Farm Bill: Glossary, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/farmbill/2002glossary.htm.
20 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-171, 116 Stat. 134
(2002).
21 Id. at 183.
22 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-127, 110
Stat. 888, 889 (1996).
23 U.S.D.A. Economic Research Services, The 2002 Farm Bill: Glossary, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/farmbill/2002glossary.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
24 See e.g. Office of the United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov.
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Corporation."25 By contrast, FAIR did not require a "no cost" operation of
the sugar program. However, despite the affirmative statement present in
the 2002 farm statute, the 2002 statute actually reduces the capacity of the
sugar program to operate at no cost to the government as compared to the
1996 act. The elimination of marketing assessments, forfeiture penalties,
and a reduction in the loan interest rate have increased potential costs
under the Farm Securities and Rural Investment Act of 2002 when
compared with FAIR.
The Agriculture Appropriations Act of 2000 suspended marketing
assessments for sugar in 2001 and marketing assessments were officially
terminated in the 2002 farm statute.27 Marketing assessments are fees
levied per unit of production (i.e. pounds, short tons) that producers must
pay to the government to help pay for a commodity program's costs.
Without marketing assessments, the government program is operated at a
greater cost since there has been an elimination of user fees.
The ability to operate the sugar program at no cost was further
eroded by Farm Securities and Rural Investment Act elimination of
forfeiture penalties. 28 Prior to the enactment of the Farm Securities and
Rural Investment Act of 2002, sugar producers who forfeited their sugar
crop collateral were required to pay a penalty to the government for their
forfeiture. 29 Forfeiture penalties were a deterrent for farmers to prevent
crop forfeitures. Sugar forfeiture penalties effectively lowered the
necessary domestic sugar price at which it became economically sensible
to forfeit a farmer's crop. Rational farmers will seek to maximize their
profits. As a result, farmers exchange their crops for low interest
government loans when the price of sugar drops below eighteen cents per
pound, including consideration of additional costs involved in the loan
25 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-171, 116 Stat. 134
(2002).
26 See U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, 2002 Farm Bill, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/farmbill/titles/titlelcommodities.htm (last visited Oct.
25, 2007).27 d
28 Compare Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-127, 110
Stat. 888, 889 (1996); with Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No.107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).29 See U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, 2002 Farm Bill, supra note 26.
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program such as the interest rate, transportation, and forfeiture penalties.
Under FAIR, sugar cane producers paid a penalty of $.01, and beet
producers paid $.0107 on each pound of sugar forfeited.3 0 The "no cost"
mandate of the sugar program in the Farm Securities and Rural
Investment Act was hampered further by the reduction in loan interest rates
to farmers. The 2002 law reduced the loan interest rate by one percentage
point, thereby reducing government income. 3'
Despite the "no cost" language in 2002's Farm Securities and
Rural Investment Act, the net affect of its provisions is to reduce payments
to the government from sugar farmers in the event of forfeiture.
Elimination of forfeiture fees, marketing assessments and reduced interest
rates operate to keep additional money in the pockets of sugar producers at
tax payers' expense in the event of forfeiture. Sugar farmers could forfeit
their sugar crops for loans at reduced interest, and without penalty under
the Farm Securities and Rural Investment Act. Based on the forfeiture
scheme in effect as a result of the Farm Securities and Rural Investment
Act of 2002, farmers should only forfeit their crop to the Commodity
Credit Corporation when the loan rate and costs of forfeiture,
transportation, forfeiture penalties, and the interest rate make forfeiture
more profitable than crop sales at the domestic sugar price. Elimination of
forfeiture costs, such as penalties and reduction of the interest rate, can
result in forfeitures at higher domestic prices under the Farm Securities
and Rural Investment Act of2002 than under FAIR.
IV. THE PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE ECONOMIC MODEL
A perfectly competitive market creates an environment where
resources are allocated to their maximum efficiencies, and there is no
economic waste. The perfectly competitive market is an unachievable
ideal, but represents an ideal worthy of study. The closer a particular
market gets to the ideal of the perfectly competitive market, the less waste
results and the greater the efficiency of the market. Therefore, it is
beneficial to work towards the ideal as much as possible. There are six
30 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-127, 110
Stat. 888, 889 (1996).
31 See U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, 2002 Farm Bill, supra note 26.
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fundamental assumptions for the operation and formation of a perfectly
competitive market. 32  These six assumptions are: (1) there must be
numerous buyers and sellers with each operating independently and
rationally; (2) no one buyer or seller can affect price such that each buyer
and seller consumes and produces such a negligible amount of a product
so that no one market participant can influence the price; (3) there are no
barriers to entry or exit from the market; (4) all market participants are
fully and costlessly informed; (5) every product in the market must be
homogenous and perfectly interchangeable with every other product; and
(6) the forces of supply and demand must be unfettered. The perfectly
competitive market assures maximum efficiency by ensuring that the
supply of a produced good is exactly what is needed to meet demand for
that good. If supply precisely matches demand, then there is no waste.
A. There must be numerous buyers and sellers. Each must be operating
independently and rationally as profit maximizers.
The perfectly competitive economic model relies on the
assumption that there are numerous rational and independent buyers and
sellers. 33 Actors must not be acting in collusion so as to affect the market.
Actors must also be rational in so far as they seek to maximize profit, or
"opulence" in the vocabulary of Adam Smith.34  Certainly there are
numerous buyers of sugar. Virtually every resident of the United States is
a buyer and consumer of sugar. There are also numerous companies that
use sugar in the manufacturing processes for everything from cakes and
bread to canned foods and ice cream. The American Sugar Alliance, an
industry group, cites United States Department of Agriculture statistics,
32 Some economists list the six fundamentals as four, the fundamental assumptions listed
are actually the same; there is simply a more divisive classification in the six fundamental
assumptions approach. See e.g. STEPHEN A. MATHIS & JANET KOSCIANSKI,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY; AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 323-325 (Prentice Hall 2002),
EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICs 289-291 (W.W. Norton &
Company 2004) (1970), PHILIP E. AREEDA, JOHN L. SOLOW & HERBERT HOvENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 5
(Aspen Law & Business 2002).
3 See MATHIS & KOSCIANSKI, supra note 32.
34 See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen &
Co. Ltd. 1904) (1776).
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finding that in 2002, on average, each American consumed about forty-
five pounds of sugar per year. 35
There are numerous sugar sellers as well, at least in regards to
farmers. According to the 2002 Census of Agriculture conducted by the
United States Department of Agriculture, there were 5,027 sugar beet
farms and 953 sugar cane farms at an average size of 271.7 acres and
1026.6 acres, respectively. 36 These totals are down from the 1997 Census
of Agriculture when there were 7,057 sugar beet farms, and 1,079 sugar
cane farms. 37 Nevertheless, the 2002 Census numbers, whether indicative
of a consolidation of raw sugar producers or not, still represents a
multitude of raw sugar sellers. Each sugar grower, as a private business
venture, seeks to maximize its profits. Maximization of profits represents
rational market behaviour. In seeking to maximize profits in a rational
manner, sugar growers may make the justifiable business decision to
forfeit their sugar crop to the government's Commodity Credit
Corporation whenever the price of sugar drops below the 18 cents per
pound federal loan rate after consideration of loan interest and
transportation costs.
However, while there are numerous sugar buyers and sellers, sugar
growers/sellers do not act independently. Sugar farmers and refiners are
part of powerful lobby organizations such as the American Sugar
Alliance. Raw sugar is an industry that produces a good which is
indistinguishable regardless of who grows it. It also enjoys a controlled,
partially closed market where domestic production does not exceed
domestic demand. Through the federal government's non-recourse loan
3s American Sugar Alliance, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.sugaralliance.org/desktopdefault.aspx?pageid=97 (question number six)
(Forty-five pounds per year, per person, is a tremendous amount of sugar. Sugar is used
in a variety of industrial and culinary activities as a preservative, a sweetener, a bulking
agent, and a fermenting agent. In addition to use of refined sugar in the home, sugar is
used in many processed foods) (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
36 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERv., HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS:




38 See generally American Sugar Alliance, About ASA,
www.sugaralliance.org/desktopdefault.aspx?page id-4 (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
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programs, sugar farmers can exchange their crops as collateral for a low
interest government loan whenever domestic sugar prices fall below the
loan rate plus transportation and interest.39 In addition, sugar importation
is controlled through Tariff Rate Quotas. 4 0 Farmers are thereby part of a
larger federal pricing and production scheme controlled by the federal
government through the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002.
B. No one buyer or seller can affect price.
A perfectly competitive economic model requires that each buyer
and seller consumes such a negligible amount of a product, so that no one
buyer or seller can influence the price, due to the amount that they produce
or consume.
Sugar must be extracted from the cane or the beet root in
preparation for human consumption. Sugar consumers are many and
varied. Almost every person in the United States is a consumer of sugar in
some quantity, and even industrial consumers do not consume such a
tremendous amount of production so as to affect the price. While there are
numerous sugar refiners in the United States, the three biggest refiners are
essentially super-buyers and were responsible for 67% of production in
2004 (down from 76% in 1999).41 Imperial, Domino Foods, and United
Sugars have 19%, 24%, and 24% of the market share for sugar refining,
respectively.42 With two-thirds of the domestic sugar refining market
controlled by three players, there is clearly a possibility, under normal
circumstances, to influence price due to the amount produced. However,
the United States sugar market cannot be defined as being under "normal
circumstances." What is relevant in regards to the ideal efficiency of
domestic raw sugar production is not the finished product output of the
39 See U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, The 2002 Farm Bill: Provisions and
Economic Implications,
http://222.ers.usda.gov/Features/farmbill/titles/titlecommodities.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2007).
40 d.
41 Jack Roney, The U.S. Sugar Industry: Large, Efficient, and Challenged, 106 no.1266
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individual sugar refiners, but rather their share of the domestic raw sugar
crop that is purchased by those refiners. Absent control, three refiners
with a 67% market share could certainly affect the price of raw sugar.
However, raw sugar prices are insulated by both minimum price and
maximum price protections.43 Raw sugar producers are Jrotected by the
non-recourse loan program under the 2002 farm statute. Whenever the
domestic price of sugar dips below 18 cents per pound, a farmer can
borrow 18 cents per pound of raw sugar from the government Commodity
Credit Corporation in exchange for their raw sugar crop.45 The price is
protected from rising too high by the Tariff Rate Quota system, which
allows the government to authorize increased sugar imports whenever
domestic production cannot meet domestic demand. Insufficient domestic
supply would result in increased price, but for the ability to increase
supply through increased imports. Under the controls imposed by the
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, the impact of the super-
buyers is effectively controlled. Therefore, in practice the United States
sugar market does not violate the second principal of the perfectly
competitive economic model.
C. There are no barriers to entry or exit in and out of markets.
Producers of a good must be able to enter or leave the market
easily without the imposition of artificial barriers by governments, firms,
or costs.46 In the case of many goods, this fundamental assumption is
rarely achieved, and sugar is no exception. There are barriers to entry into
the domestic United States sugar market that include import quotas and
tariffs. For 2006, the import quota, or "Tariff Rate Quota" for raw sugar,
was set at 1,901,497 short tons raw value.47 This was the amount of
43 See U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, The 2002 Farm Bill: Provisions and
Economic Implications,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/farmbill/titles/titlelcommodities.htm (last visited Oct.
27, 2007).
4 Id
45 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C. § 7272 (2002).
46 MATHIS & KoscIANSKI, supra note 32.
47 United States Department of Agriculture News Release No. 0035.06.
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/newsReleases?area=newsroom&subject-landing&topic=n
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foreign sugar that could be imported into the United States market. The
refined sugar Tariff Rate Quota is set at 529,013 short tons raw value.48
Tariff Rate Quotas tend to be set fairly low, and then adjusted once
domestic sugar demand and production can be predicted with more
accuracy.49 For instance, the raw sugar Tariff Rate Quota for fiscal year
2006 comprised the minimum amount negotiated through the World Trade
Organization of 1,231,497 short tons; an additional 120,000 short tons
announced on August 19, 2005; 300,000 short tons announced December
2, 2005; and a further 250,000 short tons on February 2, 2006.50 Due in
part to hurricane damage in 200551 and increased domestic demand, the
domestic sugar industry remains incapable of supplying enough sugar to
meet domestic demand.52 The sugar Tariff Rate Quota system limits the
amount of sugar that can be imported into the United States by setting a
maximum amount of sugar that a foreign country can export into the
United States market. The Tariff Rate Quota essentially reduces the
number of "sellers" in the United States market, which reduces the supply.
This results in an increase in the cost of sugar, and a resulting decline in
demand, which is in turn stifled by the increased cost. The result is waste
in the market, as not every buyer who would buy sugar at the optimal cost
will do so when the supply is artificially constricted and the price is




51 Since sugar cane is grown predominantly in Florida and Louisiana, 2005's hurricane
season, which included Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Ivan hit the heart of United
States sugar cane production. U.S.D.A. Economic Research Service, Sugar and
Sweetners: Background, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/Background.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2007).
52 Stephen Haley, Andy Jerardo & David Kelch, Sugar and Sweeteners Outlook 6,
http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usdalers/SSS//2000s/2005/SSS-09-29-2005.pdf (last
visited Oct. 24, 2007).
5 See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Announces FY 2008
Tariff-Rate Quota Allocations for Raw Cane Sugar, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2007/August/USTR Announces
_FY_2008_Tariff-RateQuotaAllocations forRawCaneSugar.html?ht- (last visited
Oct. 25, 2007).
77
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 15, No. I
artificially high. This can be demonstrated by the following movement
along a hypothetical sugar demand curve:
Demonstrative Movement Along a Sugar Demand










The graph above demonstrates the movement along the demand
curve for sugar when considering two prices, Dl and D2. Dl is the
demand at the United States Market price, whereas D2 is the hypothetical
demand at the world market price. 54 The quantity of sugar demanded is
lower than it should be due to the high United States price as compared to
the world market price.
- United States Department of Agriculture, Table 3 (world raw sugar price, monthly,
quarterly, and by calendar and fiscal year 2007), and Table 4 (U.S. raw sugar price, duty-
fee paid, New York, monthly, quarterly, and by calendar and fiscal year) (App. A-3, A-4,
A-5), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/data.htm.
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D. All market participants are fully and costlessly informed.
The perfectly competitive market also requires that all buyers and
sellers in the market have complete and accurate access to all pertinent
information regarding the good.s Market participants must be fully
cognizant of price, technology, benefits, quality, and any other related
market information.56 Full and costless information is perhaps the most
idealistic prerequisite of the fully competitive market. In reality, all
information has a price, whether that price is from research, studies,
experience, or advertising. In order to costlessly keep all market
participants informed, information would have to be disseminated in a
manner that is beyond our current capabilities, like electricity along a
perfect superconductor. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible for all market
participants to be fully informed about a product. Full information
requires a level of perfection which almost always exceeds technical and
practical capabilities. However, what is achievable is a level of relatively
full information and dissemination of that information. "Perfectly full
information that is costlessly disseminated" can be compared to the
hypothetical point at which a hyperbola intersects an X or Y axis.
However, there is a level of product enlightenment that is generally
economically acceptable.
Raw sugar meets the requirement for full and costless information
as much as any product feasibly could. Sugar market participants have
been working with sugar for millennia. Health benefits such as increased
energy, draw backs such as sugar lows, and repercussions such as cavities
are common knowledge for not just growers and refiners, but the masses
of end users as well. Furthermore, information is available relatively
costlessly through experience, common knowledge, labeling and the
dissemination of information across such media as the internet. While no
transfer of information is completely free, the transfer of information
about sugar is either of such a low cost as to be insignificant, or the cost is
so shielded by time as to be effectively costless for current market
" MATHis & KOSCIANSKI, supra note 32.561d
5 A hyperbola crosses the X or Y axis only at infinity, which is a practical impossibility,
as is perfect information.
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participants. 8 As such, raw sugar does not substantively offend the
requirement of the perfectly competitive economic model that all market
participants be fully and costlessly informed.
E. Every product in this particular market must be homogeneous or a
perfect substitute for every other product.
Perfect competition requires that the buyer of any product to not
care about which seller they purchase that product from.59 Each good or
service that is produced within the market is homogeneous and
interchangeable. Markets for agricultural goods are excellent examples of
markets in which the good produced by one firm is generally
indistinguishable from the good produced by another firm. Sugar from
producer A and sugar from producer B are homogenous in that a buyer of
sugar will not care whom he purchases his sugar. The sugar produced by
A is indistinguishable from that produced by B. This homogony is
manifested in the complete lack of advertising in favor of particular
producers of sugar. The granulated sugar crystals from producer A, if
mistaken for those from producer B, would be indistinguishable by a
consumer. In contrast, an example of a market where the product of one
firm is distinguishable from that of another firm is the automobile
industry.61
F. The unfettered forces of supply and demand
The final basic assumption for the perfectly competitive economic
model is that the forces of supply and demand are unconstrained. Buyers
and sellers must be free to produce and purchase the amount that they
require free of control or artificial barriers. However, supply is effectively
58 This would be the case in situations where research has been done decades ago, and the
information gleaned from such research continues to be used today, and will continue to
be used in the future.
59 EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMics 290 (W.W. Norton & Company
2004) (1970).
6 MATHIS & KOScIANsKI, supra note 32.
61 For instance, Toyota has its specific "Corolla" and Ford has its specific "Explorer"
brand of vehicle. Each brand and each manufacturer is distinct and produces distinct
products.
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controlled by the federal sugar Tariff Rate Quota system.62 The Tariff
Rate Quota system controls supply by dictating the amount of
international sugar that is permitted access to the United States market.
This control of supply has the additional effect of curtailing demand.
Sugar consuming companies in the United States know that they will only
have access to a certain supply of sugar in a given year. As a result,
production becomes geared to the government mandated supply of sugar
rather than to what demand may actually exist should there be no
constraint on the supply. Due to the constricted supply, it is difficult to
anticipate what the true demand for sugar in the United States would be if
companies could buy sugar off of the relatively inaccessible world market,
let alone at the world market price. Rather, sugar users are told how much
sugar they can use through the amount that is permitted into the country
by the sugar Tariff Rate Quota system plus domestic production. This
serves as an unnecessary and disruptive fettering of the forces of supply
and demand.
V. AT No COST To TAXPAYERS?
The Department of Agriculture and the Sugar Alliance, an industry
advocacy organization, laud the sugar provisions in the Farm Securities
and Rural Investment Act of 2002 for operating at no cost to taxpayers. 63
While it is true that the program has not resulted in wide scale crop
forfeitures to the Commodity Credit Corporation, this is due only to the
high cost of sugar in the United States, not the inherent fairness of the
2002 farm statute.64 Sugar growers can exchange their crop for the low
interest government loans when the price of sugar drops below eighteen
cents per pound, while factoring in the rate of interest and cost of
62 U.S.D.A. Foreign Agricultural Service, Administrating Sugar Imports,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/imports/ussugar.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
6 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, THE 2002 FARM BILL:
PROVISIONS AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1 (2002), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib778/.
6 See United States Sugar data, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/data/TableO4.xls (Appendix A-4) (last visited
Oct. 25, 2007).
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transportation.65 However, for only one year in the past 20 years has the
66
price of sugar in the United States stayed below twenty cents per pound.
The average price of raw sugar in the United States has hovered around
twenty-one cents per pound, while the average world price of raw sugar
has hovered around ten cents per pound.67 The price has been kept high as
a result of the Tariff Rate Quota system which controls the supply of raw
sugar, thereby increasing the price and constraining the market demand of
sugar to the available sugar supply. This increased price is what sugar
consumers, whether they are refineries, factories, or households, wind up
paying. It is therefore technically true that the sugar program itself is
operated at zero cost to the taxpayers under the 2002 farm legislation,
however, the sugar program is integrally tied to the Tariff Rate Quota
system which keeps the price of sugar in the United States at almost twice
the world price of sugar, and above the loan default rate under the 2002
farm legislation. 68 The two programs operate in tandem, with the one
operating at "no cost" only because the second maintains an even higher
cost than the first. The resulting cost to United States consumers is
tremendous, and any claim of "no-cost" by the sugar industry is
disingenuous and inaccurate.
VI. IMPACT OF SUGAR PRICE CONTROL
A. Domestic impact.
The United States sugar program should be radically altered or
eliminated. The United States General Accounting Office wrote a report
to congressional requesters entitled Sugar Program: Supporting Sugar
Prices Has Increased User's Costs While Benefiting Producers, which
65 Forfeiture penalties have been eliminated and interest rates are 1% lower than under
1996's FAIR. Id.
66 2000 is the only year that sugar prices did not exceed 20 cents per pound; sugar prices
in 2000 were about 19 cents per pound, which is still above the non-recourse loan level of
18 cents per pound. See United States Sugar data, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefmg/Sugar/data/TableO4.xls (Appendix A-4) (last visited
Oct. 25, 2007).6 7 See United States Sugar data, supra note 66, at App. A-3, A-4, A-5.68 id.
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succinctly sums up the sugar problem in its title.69 According to the
report, the General Accounting Office concluded that in 1998, the sugar
program resulted in a loss to consumers of $1,938,000, in 1999 dollars. 70
However, this loss was partially offset by financial gains to sugar
producers of $1,045,000, in 1999 dollars.7 ' According to the General
Accounting Office, the net loss to the United States economy was
$893,000,000 in 1999 dollars.72 Adjusting the totals based on an average
annual rate of inflation of 2.62%73 for the eight years from 1999 to 2006,
the loss to sugar consumers in 2006 dollars is approximately two billion,
three hundred and ninety-eight million dollars ($2,398,000,000). Net
losses to the economy based upon the annual inflation rate and adjusted
dollars are approximately one billion, one hundred and five million 2006
dollars ($1,105,000,000).74 The adjusted total loss to consumers
represents a loss of approximately eight dollars per person in the United
States, offset by the payments to sugar growers. When one considers
that these totals represent the losses caused by only one crop, of the
dozens grown in the United States, the potential economic waste caused
by economic protectionist programs such as the sugar program is
staggering. Abolishment of the United States sugar program could have
69 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,, SUGAR PROGRAM: SUPPORTING SUGAR PRICES
HAS INCREASED USER'S COSTS WHILE BENEFITING PRODUCERS, (2000) available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00126.pdf.
'
0 Id. at 21.
71 Id.
72 d
7 See Historical U.S. Inflation Rate 1914-Present,
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/InflationRate/Historicallnlfation.aspx (additional
information and figures based upon data compiled by the Federal Bureau of Labor
Statistics) (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). The average annual inflation rate was arrived at
by averaging the annual rates of inflation as follows: 2.19% for 1999; 3.38% for 2000;
2.83% for 2001; 1.59% for 2002; 2.27% for 2003; 2.68% for 2004; 3.39% for 2005; and
using the combined average for the current year, 2006 for an average of 2.627% over 8
years.
74 id.
7s Eight dollars per person based on dividing 2,398,000,000 in consumer losses by the
approximate 300,000,000 people in the United States as of October, 2006. See U.S.
Census Bureau News, Nation's Population to Reach300 Million on Oct. 17, available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/007616.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
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significant benefits for the United States economy. The abolition of
similar programs for cotton, soybeans, tobacco and many other crops
could result in additional savings to the United States economy.76
This discussion is not intended to ignore the benefits accrued to the
United States economy by the sugar industry. However, the economic
benefits provided by the sugar industry are based upon an inflated price
for sugar that benefits a few producers to the detriment of many
consumers. The high price of sugar in the United States encourages
increases in domestic production (supply) that would not occur if market
forces under the perfectly competitive economic model were allowed to
control supply and demand. This leads to more sugar produced in the
United States, as well as more sugar jobs in production. An artificially
higher sugar price also leads to more land being used for sugar production
as opposed to more efficient activities. 77 Should the price of sugar in the
United States drop towards the world sugar price, 8 then there would be
less incentive to continue increasing domestic sugar production in the
United States. 79  In fact, there would likely be a decrease in domestic
production as cheaper sugar becomes accessible to United States
consumers and land that is currently being used for sugar could be
converted to other, more efficient uses. Some land currently under
76 See Kevin Watkins, Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of U.S. Cotton Subsidies on
Africa 12 (2002), available at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/bp30_cotton.pdf (last visited
Apr. 18. 2007).
n Sugar beet farms covered a total of 1,303,600 acres in 2006. Sugar cane farms covered
a total of 898,100 acres in 2006. In Florida and Louisiana, sugar cane uses 400,000 and
435,000 acres of land respectively. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGIC. NAT'L AGRIc. STATISTICS
SERV. 11 (2007) available at http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/current/CropProd/
(App. A-1 & A-2) (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
78 The General Accounting Office report estimated that removal of the sugar program in
1998 would drop the price of sugar in the United states from 22 cents per pound to about
12 2 cents per pound, which is comparable to and competitive with the world price of
sugar. Robertson, supra note 69, atl4, 24 .
7 Robertson, supra note 69, at 15. United States sugar production has been steadily
increasing, due to technological innovation and increase in land used for cane and beet
production. "Many farmers have increased the size of their sugarcane and sugar beet
crops because these crops have offered better returns than cotton, wheat, or other cops
that the farmers grew in the past." Id.
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cultivation for sugar cane or beet is only being efficiently used under the
current distortional pricing.
The United States sugar program of Tariff Rate Quotas and non-
recourse loan system guarantees profits for sugar producers. This results
in increased employment for sugar producers, but results in a net decrease
for United States employment. High sugar prices create primary industry
jobs, but increase the costs of secondary industry manufacturers and
consumers. As a result, companies that use sugar as a raw material pay
higher costs and therefore enjoy lower profits and have less money to
reinvest into their business. This results in fewer jobs in sugar-using
industries such as candy and food manufacturing. According to the
Grocery Manufacturers of America, a manufacturing industry group, the
United States sugar program has resulted in the loss of about 10,000
refining and manufacturing jobs.so
Eliminating the United States sugar program and allowing market
forces under the perfectly competitive model would result in cost savings,
more efficient use of land and more employment in the United States.
B. International impact.
Sugar is not the only crop in need of market openness, nor is the
United States the only country that protects its domestic farmers. Despite
the recent stalling of the Doha round of global trade negotiations,
programs such as the United States sugar program should be used as
reciprocal bargaining chips for global trade liberalization. Mutual
elimination of trade barriers would provide economic benefits for all
countries involved. For instance, the European Union and Japan also have
extensive agricultural protection and subsidization programs. The opening
of markets in developed countries to agricultural products in developing
countries would have the twofold benefit of reducing the consumer costs
in developed countries while concurrently providing stable employment
80 Press Release, Grocery Manufacturers of America, Sugar Reform Caucus' Goals
Critical for Trade, Job Opportunities (Oct. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.gmabrands.com/news/docs/NewsRelease.cfm?DoclD=1412. Grocery
Manufacturers of America is a member of the Coalition for Sugar Reform. Id.
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and economic growth to developing countries. 8' Employment brings
stability, economic growth, and satisfaction. This would have a positive
effect on major issues such as the rise of global fundamentalism, conflict,
and the mass movement of people. Rather than sending armies and aid
overseas, the United States should open its markets to allow foreign goods
in, not only to improve its own economy, but to benefit developing
economies and promote global stability. With the expiration of the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 in late 2007, the United States
has a tremendous opportunity to benefit its own taxpayers as well as
people around the world. Rather than cling to outdated ideals of
agricultural protectionism, the United States government should take the
opportunity to eliminate costly programs such as the sugar program in
exchange for greater economic openness in other countries. By allowing
market forces to affect prices and thereby the supply and demand of
commodities, greater economic efficiencies can be achieved. The United
States should take a leadership role in the push for free trade that steps
beyond empty rhetoric and seeks substantive change.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States sugar program fails to meet the basic
assumptions of the perfectly competitive economic model. Legislated
through the Tariff Rate Quota system and the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002, the sugar program results in economic waste and
inefficiency. This results in substantial economic losses to the United
States economy. The sugar program, non-recourse loans, and Tariff Rate
Quotas for sugar should be abolished. Abolishment of the programs
would result in economic gains to the United States economy. With the
imminent expiration of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002, though the implementation of a new farm bill late in 2007, the
federal government has an opportunity to redress many of the inequities
8 For instance, Professor Dale Jamieson mentions that United States subsidies to 25,000
domestic cotton farmers are "greater than the entire economic output of Burkina Faso, a
country in which two million people depend on cotton for their livelihoods." Dale
Jamieson, Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing
World, 9 J. ETHICS 151, 168 (2005).
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and wasteful practices of the existent agricultural subsidy system.
Furthermore, great economic gains could likely be achieved through
bilateral or multilateral international trade negotiations that result in the
elimination of similar wasteful programs in developing countries. The
United States sugar program, while bad, is a manifestation of a larger
problem that costs consumers in the developed world money and
economies and in the developing world jobs for the benefit of a small
coterie of domestic agricultural producers. The few benefit at the expense
of the many, and this must be stopped.
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